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Abstract
Ongoing declines in production of the world’s fisheries may have serious ecological and socioeconomic consequences. As a
result, a number of international efforts have sought to improve management and prevent overexploitation, while helping
to maintain biodiversity and a sustainable food supply. Although these initiatives have received broad acceptance, the
extent to which corrective measures have been implemented and are effective remains largely unknown. We used a survey
approach, validated with empirical data, and enquiries to over 13,000 fisheries experts (of which 1,188 responded) to assess
the current effectiveness of fisheries management regimes worldwide; for each of those regimes, we also calculated the
probable sustainability of reported catches to determine how management affects fisheries sustainability. Our survey shows
that 7% of all coastal states undergo rigorous scientific assessment for the generation of management policies, 1.4% also
have a participatory and transparent processes to convert scientific recommendations into policy, and 0.95% also provide
for robust mechanisms to ensure the compliance with regulations; none is also free of the effects of excess fishing capacity,
subsidies, or access to foreign fishing. A comparison of fisheries management attributes with the sustainability of reported
fisheries catches indicated that the conversion of scientific advice into policy, through a participatory and transparent
process, is at the core of achieving fisheries sustainability, regardless of other attributes of the fisheries. Our results illustrate
the great vulnerability of the world’s fisheries and the urgent need to meet well-identified guidelines for sustainable
management; they also provide a baseline against which future changes can be quantified.
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Introduction
Fisheries play an important role in the global provision of food,
directly accounting for at least 15% of the animal protein
consumed by humans and indirectly supporting food production
by aquaculture and livestock industries [1,2]. Demand for fish is
expected to grow given escalating animal protein demands in
developing countries and the rapidly increasing human population
[1–4]. However, reported global marine fisheries landings have
declined by about 0.7 million tonnes per year since the late 1980s
[5], with at least 28% of the world’s fish stocks overexploited or
depleted, and 52% fully exploited by 2008 [1]. Severe reductions
in abundance can change population genetic structure [6], harm
the recovery potential of stocks [7], trigger broader ecosystem
changes (e.g., [8–10]), threaten livelihoods [1], and endanger food
security [11] and efforts towards the reduction of hunger [11,12].
Given the different ecological and socioeconomic consequences of
a global fisheries crisis, a number of international efforts have
sought to improve management in the hope of moving towards
sustainable marine fisheries (sensu Pauly et al. [13]). Some of these
initiatives, which incorporated to varying degrees the improve-
ment of marine fisheries management, include the United Nations
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries from the Food and
Agriculture Organization [14], the Convention on Biological
Diversity (http://www.cbd.int/), and the Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment (http://www.millenniumassessment.org). Although
these initiatives have received broad acceptance, the extent to
which corrective measures are implemented and effective remains
poorly known [15–17]. Using a survey approach, validated with
empirical data and enquiries to fisheries experts, we quantified the
status of fisheries management in each nation worldwide that has
an exclusive economic zone (EEZ). We also related our
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measurements of management effectiveness to a recently devel-
oped index of fisheries sustainability. To our knowledge, these
results represent the first global assessment of how fisheries
management attributes influence sustainability, while providing a
baseline against which future changes can be quantified.
Results and Discussion
Approach and Validation
We evaluated the effectiveness of national fisheries management
regimes by quantifying their degree of compliance with a well-
recognized set of conditions necessary for sustainable fisheries: (1)
robust scientific basis for management recommendations, (2)
transparency in turning recommendations into policy, (3) capacity
to enforce and ensure compliance with regulations, and minimiz-
ing the extent of (4) subsidies, (5) fishing overcapacity, and (6)
foreign fishing in the form of fisheries agreements [8,14]. The
extent to which individual countries met or were affected by these
conditions was quantified using a set of normative questions
assembled in an Internet survey, which was systematically
distributed to fisheries experts worldwide. Over 13,000 experts
were contacted as part of this survey, of which 1,188 responded
from each country bordering the ocean (i.e., EEZ; see Materials
and Methods for additional details on areas surveyed). Experts
were mostly fisheries managers, university professors, and
governmental and nongovernmental researchers. Despite these
diverse backgrounds, responses were highly consistent within each
country (i.e., where multiple responses were given, 67% of experts
chose the same answer to any given question and 27% chose the
next closest response; Figure 1A and 1B) and in accordance with
independent empirical data (we found a strong correlation
between experts’ opinions and empirical data [r=0.74,
p,0.00001, n=28 countries; Figure 1C]). Justification, extended
results, and discussion on the reliability and validity of the experts’
data are presented in Materials and Methods. We also used a
Monte Carlo simulation approach to include score uncertainty
estimates in the results. We provide the main results and general
conclusions in the text; full results are presented in Figures S1, S2,
S3, S4, S5 and http://as01.ucis.dal.ca/ramweb/surveys/fishery_
assessment/.
Scientific Robustness
Critical to the success of fisheries management is the scientific
basis on which management recommendations are made [18,19].
Preventing the collapse of fisheries and ecosystem-wide impacts
requires scientific advice in which uncertainty is minimized by
using skilled personnel, models that include, not only the dynamics
of fished stocks, but also their embedded ecosystems, and high-
quality and up-to-date data (such that reliable recommendations
can be adapted as conditions and stocks fluctuate). Alternatively,
the effects of uncertainty can be minimized by applying
precautionary approaches in the face of limited knowledge
[18,20]. Of the world’s 209 EEZs analyzed, 87% have scientific
personnel who are qualified (e.g., with Ph.D.- or Masters-level
education, or have participated in training courses or relevant
conferences) to perform fisheries assessments and provide science-
based management advice (Figure S1A), approximately 7% use
holistic models as the basis of management recommendations (i.e.,
including a broad set of biological and environmental data on
fisheries to enable ecosystem-wide understanding of fisheries
drivers and impacts; see Figure S1B), 61% carry out frequent
assessments to ensure the effectiveness of existing management
measures (Figure S1C), and 17% implement precautionary
approaches for at least some species (Figure S1D). We summarized
all responses that pertain to ‘‘scientific robustness’’ on a linear scale
using multidimensional scaling. (Multidimensional scaling is an
ordination method that uses the similarities and dissimilarities
among responses to reduce the number of variables analyzed. This
facilitates the assessment and visualization of patterns from several
dimensions into one. Very simplistically, this is analogous to
calculating an average of the different scores for each country; see
Materials and Methods.) The resulting scale ranged from 0 to 1,
and we divided it into four quarters (i.e., from 0 to 0.25, from 0.25
to 0.5, from 0.5 to 0.75, and from 0.75 to 1, with the lowest
quarter indicating the worst combination of attributes and the top
the best). We found that 7% of all EEZs rank in the top quarter of
such a scale (Figure 2, countries depicted in Figure 3A), which
account for approximately 9% of the world’s fisheries catches and
approximately 7% of the world’s fished stocks (data are for 2004;
see details in Figure S2). Distinguishing between high- and low-
income countries using per capita Gross Domestic Product (i.e.,
2007 per capita Gross Domestic Product larger or smaller than
US$10,000, respectively), we found that high-income countries
ranked significantly higher on the scale of scientific robustness
(Mann-Whitney U test: p,0.00001, Figure S1E).
We note that a recent study indicated the success of catch
shares, as individual transferable quotas, in preventing fisheries
collapses [21]. This strategy has been implemented primarily in
the EEZs of New Zealand, Australia, United States, Iceland,
Chile, and Peru, which are all countries with robust scientific
capabilities (Figure 3A). Our results indicate that the global
adoption of individual transferable quotas should be considered
with caution given that their underlying success rests on the
scientific robustness of the implemented quotas and that few
countries meet that condition (Figure 3A).
Author Summary
Global fisheries are in crisis: marine fisheries provide 15% of
the animal protein consumed by humans, yet 80% of the
world’s fish stocks are either fully exploited, overexploited
or have collapsed. Several international initiatives have
sought to improve the management of marine fisheries,
hoping to reduce the deleterious ecological and socioeco-
nomic consequence of the crisis. Unfortunately, the extent
to which countries are improving their management and
whether such intervention ensures the sustainability of the
fisheries remain unknown. Here, we surveyed 1,188
fisheries experts from every coastal country in the world
for information about the effectiveness with which fisheries
are being managed, and related those results to an index of
the probable sustainability of reported catches. We show
that the management of fisheries worldwide is lagging far
behind international guidelines recommended to minimize
the effects of overexploitation. Only a handful of countries
have a robust scientific basis for management recommen-
dations, and transparent and participatory processes to
convert those recommendations into policy while also
ensuring compliance with regulations. Our study also
shows that the conversion of scientific advice into policy,
through a participatory and transparent process, is at the
core of achieving fisheries sustainability, regardless of other
attributes of the fisheries. These results illustrate the
benefits of participatory, transparent, and science-based
management while highlighting the great vulnerability of
the world’s fisheries services. The data for each country can
be viewed at http://as01.ucis.dal.ca/ramweb/surveys/
fishery_assessment.
The World’s Management of Fisheries
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Policy Transparency
Guidelines to improve the acceptance and compliance with
fishing regulations recommend that decisions be based on the best
available scientific evidence and follow a transparent and
participatory process [8,14,22,23]. Unfortunately, the process of
policymaking can be subjected to substantial political pressures,
perhaps including corruption. In our survey, management
authorities from 92% of the EEZs consider scientific recommen-
dations in formulating policies (Figure S1F), and in 87%, all
stakeholders are consulted or their opinions considered (Figure
S1G). Yet in 91% of all EEZs, regulations commonly face
economic or political pressures to increase allowable catches or to
implement regulations that err on the side of risk rather than
caution (Figure S1I), whereas a surprising 83% of EEZs are
thought to face corruption or bribery (Figure S1H). Of all EEZs,
26% rank in the top quarter of a scale of ‘‘policymaking
transparency,’’ which summarizes, through multidimensional
scaling, the attributes of considering scientific advice, participa-
tion, pressures, and corruption (Figure S1J, countries depicted in
Figure 3B). Only 1.4% of all EEZs are in the top quarter on the
combined scales of scientific robustness and policymaking
transparency (Figure 2), which together accounted for 0.85% of
the world’s fisheries catch and 1.1% of the world’s fished stocks
(Figure S2). There were no significant differences between low-
and high-income countries with respect to policy transparency
(Figure S1J). However, the underlying mechanism was different,
with low-income countries facing more corruption (p,0.00001,
Figure S1H) and less commonly incorporating scientific advice
(p,0.005, Figure S1F), whereas high-income countries faced
slightly more political pressures (p,0.05, Figure S1I).
Implementation Capability
One of the biggest challenges in fisheries management lies in the
implementation and enforcement of regulations [23]. Poverty,
unemployment, available infrastructure for control and surveil-
lance, the severity of penalties for violations, and participation in
policymaking are all likely influencing the level of compliance with
regulations. Proper enforcement through (1) adequate funding and
equipment for the managing authorities, (2) patrolling of fishing
grounds, and (3) tough penalties for infringements, occurs in 17%
of all EEZs (Figure S1K; note that only ,6% of all EEZs impose
penalties that are sufficiently tough to deter violators). Not
surprisingly, no EEZ was free of the effects of poaching (Figure
S1L, see also [24]). On a scale of ‘‘implementation capability,’’
which summarizes, through multidimensional scaling, poaching
and the different attributes of enforcement, we found that only
approximately 5% of all EEZs are in the top quarter of such a
scale (Figure S1M, countries depicted in Figure 3C). Only two
Figure 1. Reliability and validity of the expert’s answers. Validity
refers to the degree to which the responders’ answers approach the
truth. Reliability refers to the extent to which different experts agreed in
their answers. (A) Using countries for which duplicated responses were
obtained, we show the frequency distribution of the Pearson
correlation coefficients contrasting each responder to other responders
in the same country. (B) depicts the frequency with which responders
chose the same score or the next closest choice. Dotted lines in the plot
indicate the confidence limits of a null model in which the levels of
agreement were measured when choices were made randomly. The
confidence limits are based on 1,000 repetitions of this null model. The
error bars indicate standard deviation. (C) Using empirical data collected
by another study [15], we show the similarities between our expert-
based score and an empirically based score for a particular question
(see Materials and Methods). The diagonal line indicates the 1:1 ratio.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1000131.g001
The World’s Management of Fisheries
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relatively small EEZs, those of the Faeroe and Falkland Islands,
were in the top quarter for all three indicators of scientific
robustness, policymaking transparency, and implementation
capability (Figure 2), which combined, accounted for 0.80% of
the world’s fisheries catch and 0.48% of the world’s fished stocks
(Figure S2). Better ‘‘implementation capability’’ is frequently more
common among high- than low-income countries (p,0.0001,
Figure S1M), which is mainly a consequence of better enforcement
(p,0.00001, Figure S1K) and reduced poaching in the former
(p,0.002, Figure S1L).
Extent of Subsidies, Overcapacity, and Foreign Fishing
When the structure of a management regime is weak, fisheries
will be prone to overexploitation due to several factors. Three that
have received particular attention are fishing capacity, subsidies,
and access to foreign fishing fleets [8,23,25,26]. Open access to
fishing (because of lack of effective management) leads to a ‘‘race
for fish’’ that commonly increases fleet size and fishing power. This
should reduce fish stocks, at which point fishing capacity should
stabilize given decreasing profits from reduced catches [8].
Subsidies can override this mechanism by keeping fisheries
profitable and encouraging overexploitation [8,13]. The picture
is further complicated by fisheries agreements that allow foreign
fleets to catch fish that are not caught by national fleets [25,26].
Unfortunately, such agreements are commonly made between
developing coastal and island states (often with low capacity to
assess stocks and to enforce regulations) and developed and heavily
subsidized nations [25]. Recent analyses of current agreements
indicate a high risk of overexploitation due to several reasons,
including selling fishing rights on highly migratory stocks under
bilateral agreements, selling access rights without specified catch
limits, excessive by-catch, and distortion of reported catches,
among others [25,26]. Such agreements are thought to develop
coastal economies through monetary gains and local employment.
In certain instances, revenues are also used to generate
management plans; their effectiveness, however, is unclear given
chronic weaknesses in fisheries governance and management
systems [25].
Our assessment of the extent of fishing capacity, subsidies, and
access to foreign fishing fleets yielded the following results. We
found that fleet sizes are quantified and regulated in 20% of the
world’s EEZs (Figure S1N), although in 93% of EEZs, fishing fleets
face some level of modernization to catch fish more efficiently or
cheaply (Figure S1O). Thus, although fishing capacity may be
reduced in terms of fleet size, fishing power may remain constant
or even increase due to technological improvements (i.e., fewer
improved boats being more effective at catching fish). Effective
controls on fleet size were more common among high-income than
low-income EEZs (p,0.02, Figure S1N), but the former
modernized their fleets more often than the latter (p,0.00001,
Figure S1O). Using multidimensional scaling to summarize the
results pertaining to ‘‘fishing capacity’’ (i.e., fleet size controls and
fleet modernization), we found high-income EEZs having
significantly higher fishing capacity than low-income ones
(p,0.02, Figure S1P, countries depicted in Figure 3E). Fisheries
sectors that rely to some degree on subsidies occurred in 91% of
the world’s EEZs (Figure S1Q; countries depicted in Figure 3D),
and more commonly among high- than low-income EEZs
Figure 2. Discrimination of the world’s exclusive economic zones (EEZs) according to their management effectiveness. Effectiveness
is defined in terms of scientific robustness, policymaking transparency, implementation capability, and extent of fishing capacity, subsidies, and
access to foreign fishing. Each attribute was quantified with a set of questions, whose answers were summarized into a single scale using
multidimensional scaling (see Materials and Methods). For display purposes, each scale was divided into four quarters aligned from worst- to best-
case scenarios (each quarter is color coded as indicated at the bottom of the figure). Our assessment of fishery management effectiveness started
with the classification of all analyzed EEZs among the four quarters on the scale of scientific robustness. The EEZs within each of those quarters were
then classified among the four quarters on the scale of policymaking transparency, and then those EEZs classified among the quarter of the next
attribute, with the subdivision continuing until all EEZs were classified in all attributes. The size of the bubbles is proportional to the number of EEZs
classified in each quarter. For purposes of display, subsidies, overcapacity, and fishery access agreements were summarized in a single scale with
multidimensional scaling; full results are provided in the Figure S1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1000131.g002
The World’s Management of Fisheries
PLoS Biology | www.plosbiology.org 4 June 2009 | Volume 7 | Issue 6 | e1000131
(p,0.00001, Figure S1Q) (see also [27]). Access to foreign fishing is
granted in 51% of all EEZs (Figure S1R, countries depicted in
Figure 3F), and is more frequent in low- than high-income EEZs
(p,0.00001, Figure S1R). In fact, our survey indicated that in 33%
of the EEZs that are classified as low income (commonly, countries
in Africa and Oceania), most fishing is carried out by foreign fleets
from either the European Union, South Korea, Japan, China,
Taiwan, or the United States (Figure S3). No single EEZ meets the
best standards (i.e., top quarter of the scales) of scientific
robustness, policymaking transparency, and implementation
capability while being free of the effects of excess fishing capacity,
subsidies, or access to foreign fishing (Figure 2).
Extent and Management Control of Recreational and
Small-Scale Fisheries
The notion that industrialized fishing practices are solely
responsible for the global fisheries crisis has been challenged by
evidence of the significant effects of recreational and small-scale
commercial or subsistence fisheries (e.g., [28,29]). Although less
intensive per unit area, small-scale and recreational fisheries can
Figure 3. Management effectiveness and sustainability of the world’s fisheries. These figures depict the results of experts’ opinions on the
valuation of scientific robustness (A), policymaking transparency (B), implementation capability (C), subsidies (D), fishing capacity (E) and access to
foreign fishing (F). (G) depicts the probability that fisheries in each EEZ are sustainable (Psust) in 2004.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1000131.g003
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be far more extensive spatially. Small-scale and recreational
fisheries are important in 93% and 76% of the world’s EEZs,
respectively (Figure S4), and small-scale fisheries are increasingly
more predominant among low-income EEZs whereas recreational
fisheries are more predominant in high-income countries
(p,0.0001, Figure S4). Of the world’s EEZs, 40% collect at least
some data on small-scale fishing, and 13% on recreational fishing;
30% impose regulations on the size of fish caught in small-scale
fishing, and 29% do so for recreational fishing, 7% regulate the
number of fish caught in small-scale fishing, and 15% do so for
recreational fishing, whereas 10% limit the number of fishers in
small-scale fisheries, and 3% do so for recreational fishing (Figure
S4). These management measures are more frequent in high- than
low-income EEZs (Figure S4). Measures to regulate small-scale
and recreational fishing are clearly limited and could prove
detrimental to food supply and sustainability if they continue to
operate outside the control of fisheries management institutions.
Overall Management Effectiveness
To provide a general overview of fisheries management
effectiveness, we averaged all scores on the scales of scientific
robustness, policymaking transparency, implementation capabili-
ty, fishing capacity, subsidies, and access to foreign fishing. We
excluded the effects of small-scale and recreational fisheries,
recognizing that their lack of management would extensively
reduce the scores. Only 5% of all EEZs were in the top quarter of
this scale (Figure S1S, countries depicted in Figure 4), with high-
income EEZs having significantly better overall management
effectiveness than low-income ones (p,0.00001, Figure S1S). A
sensitivity analysis indicated that the difference between high- and
low-income EEZs was driven mainly by foreign fishing agree-
ments, which disproportionally reduced the average score of low-
income EEZs. Excluding foreign fishing access leads to similarly
low average scores between high- and low-income EEZs (Figure
S1S). Similar average scores are, however, explained by different
mechanisms, namely excessive fishing capacity and subsidies in
high-income EEZs and deficient scientific, political, and enforce-
ment capacity in low-income EEZs (Figure S1).
Effect of Fishery Management on Fisheries Sustainability
One final question that we addressed in this study is to what
extent the different attributes of fisheries management analyzed
here relate to the actual sustainability of fisheries. We addressed
this question using a recently developed method to quantify the
probability that ecosystems are being sustainably fished (Psust). This
metric assesses the probability that the ratio between the biomass
losses due to fishing (i.e., total catch) expressed in primary
production equivalents and the primary production of the area in
which the catch was taken is sustainable (see Materials and
Methods, [30,31]). We found that this metric is particularly useful
to differentiate misinterpretations in landings data when used as an
indicator of fisheries status (Figure S5). The metric, for instance,
differentiates between countries in which increasing landings (a
possible symptom of good fisheries status) are sustainable or not,
and between countries in which declining landings (a possible
symptom of overfishing or enhanced management [32]) are
indicative of the sustainability of fisheries or not (Figure S5). We
used classification/regression tree analysis to identify the most
likely management attributes that affect the probability of fisheries
sustainability; we also included country wealth (i.e., the distinction
between high and low income) in the classification tree to analyze
differences in fisheries sustainability due to this factor.
Of all management attributes analyzed (i.e., scientific robust-
ness, policymaking transparency, implementation capability,
fishing capacity, subsidies, and access to foreign fishing) plus
taking into account country wealth, we found that variations in
policymaking transparency led to the largest difference in fisheries
sustainability. We found that EEZs ranked in the upper best
Figure 4. Overall management effectiveness of the world’s exclusive economic zones. This map shows the average, for each surveyed
area, of their scores on the scales of scientific robustness, policymaking transparency, implementation capability, fishing capacity, subsidies, and
access to foreign fishing.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1000131.g004
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quarter on the scale of transparent policymaking (i.e., EEZs where
scientific advice is considered and followed, all parties are
consulted and considered, and where corruption and external
economic and political pressures are minimal [see Figure S1F–
S1I]) show the largest probability of having sustainable fisheries
compared to EEZs ranked in any of the other three quarters
(Figure 5). The probability of sustainability in policy transparent
EEZs was 88% compared to 73% in others (Figure 5). We also
found that subsidies have an additional negative effect on fisheries
sustainability among EEZs with nontransparent policy systems.
We found that the probability of fisheries sustainability in
nontransparent EEZs was reduced from 78% to 67% due to the
effects of even modest subsidies (Figure 5) (i.e., EEZs ranked in the
first three quarters on the scale of subsidies or EEZs in which
fisheries sectors are dependent minimally to almost entirely on
subsidies).
The significant effect of policymaking transparency on fisheries
sustainability likely relates to the fact that this particular attribute
forms the core of the fisheries management process. Firstly, it
determines the extent to which scientific advice will be translated
into policy, whereas transparent and legitimate participation of
involved parties is likely to promote compliance with regulations
[22]. Our findings indicate that policymaking transparency is likely
to work as a ‘‘sustainability bottleneck’’ through which other
positive attributes of fisheries management are filtered. For
instance, we found that scientific robustness did not influence
the sustainability of fisheries. This may be because, in the process
of policymaking, scientific advice may be overridden due to
socioeconomic costs and political or corruption pressures. The
recent catch quotas for Mediterranean Bluefin tuna (Thunnus
thynnus) established by the International Commission for the
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas may serve as an example. In this
particular case, robust and well-founded scientific advice recom-
mended to maintain catches at 15,000 tonnes per year and to close
the fisheries during two spawning months; yet the policy was set at
22,000 tonnes per year, with fishing allowed during critical
spawning months. This is a case in which scientific robustness
may not necessarily result in sustainability due to significant
pressures in the process of policymaking. We also found that
variation in implementation capabilities did not have much effect
on fisheries sustainability. This result can also be explained by the
effect of policymaking transparency. If the policymaking process is
participatory and legitimate, it is likely that even poorly enforced
systems will move towards sustainability because of voluntary
compliance [22]. In contrast, some systems may strongly enforce
regulations, but if the regulations were flawed during the process of
policymaking, good enforcement may not bring about sustain-
ability either. If the establishment of regulations includes scientific
advice and follows a participatory mechanism, it is likely that
fisheries will be tightly regulated, regardless of who carries out the
fishing, which may also explain the lack of significance of fishing
capacity and international fisheries agreements on fisheries
sustainability. This is not to say that fishing capacity and foreign
fishing access do not have impacts on fisheries sustainability but
rather that their effects are moderated by the policymaking process
(i.e., fishing capacity and access agreements may have different
effects on sustainability in situations that are tightly regulated
compared to those that are not). Finally, our results indicate how
deficiencies in the process of policymaking can leave fisheries
vulnerable to overexploitation due to the effect of subsidies. It is
known that subsidies can override possible fishing controls exerted
by economic benefits (see section above on subsidies; [8,13,27]).
We presume, however, that this effect is likely to be more pervasive
in nontransparent systems given that fishing remains poorly
controlled or regulated and allowed to fluctuate more freely,
depending largely on subsidies.
Concluding Remarks
Improvements to fisheries management have been incorporated
into international initiatives, which have received broad accep-
tance (e.g., [14,15]). Unfortunately, our study shows that there is a
marked difference between the endorsement of such initiatives and
the actual implementation of corrective measures. The ongoing
decline in marine fisheries catches [5,9,33–36] and the ecological
and socioeconomic consequences of a fisheries crisis call for a
greater political will of countries worldwide if further fisheries
declines and their wider consequences are to be prevented.
Effective transfer of improved scientific capacities to policy,
achieved through a transparent and participatory process, will
be more important than ever in stabilizing our food supply from
the sea and preventing unnecessary losses due to management
deficiencies. Current projections suggest that total demand for
fisheries products is likely to increase by approximately 35 million
metric tonnes by 2030 (,43% of the maximum reported catch in
the late 1980s) [3,4] and by approximately 73% for small-scale
fisheries by 2025 [35]. This contrasts sharply with the 20% to 50%
reduction in current fishing effort suggested for achieving
Figure 5. Effect of fishery management on fisheries sustain-
ability. Results of a classification tree aimed to identify the most likely
fishery management attributes related to the sustainability of fisheries.
In a classification/regression tree, the factor that maximizes differences
in fisheries sustainability is placed at the root of the tree, and the EEZs
in each of its quarters are separated into different branches. This
method repeatedly tests for significant differences among the EEZs in
each branch in the remaining attributes and stops when no significant
difference exists in any attribute within the EEZs of any branch (see
Materials and Methods). The results shown here include the linking
between the probability of fisheries sustainability (Psust) and each of the
management attributes analyzed: scientific robustness, policymaking
transparency, implementation capability, fishing capacity, subsidies,
access to foreign fishing, and country wealth.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1000131.g005
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sustainability [30,36], and implies that regulators may face
increasing pressures towards unsustainable catch quotas. Given
that the demand for fish lies outside the control of conventional
fisheries management, other national and international institutions
will have to be involved to deal with poverty alleviation (inherently
improving management, Figure S1) and stabilization of the world’s
human population (to soften fisheries demand), if pressures on
management are to be prevented and sustainability achieved.
Materials and Methods
Conditions Analyzed
We considered factors broadly recognized as critical for the
sustainable management of fish stocks (by sustainability, we mean
sustainable catches and not social, economic, or institutional
sustainability and the like, which at times are also associated with
fisheries management and often dominate policy decisions). The
factors considered in the present analysis were categorized into
those related to the robustness of scientific recommendations,
transparency in the process of converting recommendations into
actual policy, the capability to enforce and ensure compliance with
regulations, and the extent of fishing capacity, subsidies, and
access to foreign fishing. Each of these attributes was evaluated
with a set of questions whose answers could be categorized in a
hierarchical order from worst- to best-case scenarios. In cases
where several questions applied to the same attribute, we
summarized all responses into a single scale using multidimen-
sional scaling. Multidimensional scaling is an ordination method
that uses similarities and dissimilarities among variables to reduce
them to a specific number of dimensions. Here, we used the
anchored multidimensional scaling method developed by Pitcher
and Preikshot [37]. In this method, hypothetical countries are
generated with the worst- and best-case scenarios for each question
and used as normative extremes of a scale on which real countries
are ranked. The approach also incorporates uncertainty using a
Monte Carlo simulation tool based on the maximum and
minimum possible for each score [38]. A copy of the software is
available on request.
Fishery Management Regimes Analyzed
We focused our assessment on fishery management conditions for
all ocean realms under the sovereignty of a defined coastal territory.
Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea [39],
the protection and harvesting of coastal resources rest within the
200-nautical mile EEZ of each coastal state. There are, however,
exceptions, such as the European Union, whose fisheries regulations
are mandated by the Common Fisheries Policy but whose
enforcement is the responsibility of the member states; member
states also differ in their fishing capability and possibly in their
compliance with regulations. Similarly, many countries have
overseas territories, which may or may not have autonomous
control of the regulation of their fisheries, and consequently, there
may be variations in the effectiveness of their management regimes.
For instance, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, French Guiana, French
Polynesia, French Southern and Antarctic lands, New Caledonia,
Saint Martin, Reunion, Guadeloupe, and Martinique all are under
the sovereignty of France, which furthermore has direct control over
its own Atlantic andMediterranean coast; yet all of these zones have
different management conditions. To consider these differences in
fishery management regimes, zones managed under the same entity
(e.g., the European Union) or zones in different parts of the world
belonging to the same sovereignty (e.g., overseas territories of
France, United Kingdom, and United States) were analyzed
separately. We also included zones that may not be technically
defined or recognized as EEZs under the United Nations (e.g.,
division among coastal states of the Baltic Sea and Black Sea). In
total, 245 such zones exist in the world (see Figure 3), which
excludes conflict zones (e.g., the Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands, and
Southern Kuriles). Out of those 245 zones, we were unable to gather
data for isolated islands under the sovereignty of the United
Kingdom (i.e., Ascension, Pitcairn, Saint Helena, South Georgia,
and the South Sandwich Islands and Tristan da Cunha) and France
(Clipperton Atoll) for which neither contacts nor information was
available. We also excluded Monaco and Singapore; interviewees at
local authorities (Coope´ration Internationale pour l’Environnement
et de De´veloppement in Monaco and the Agri-Food and Veterinary
Authority in Singapore) in both of these countries claimed that
although marine fishing occurs, it was minimal and considered
insufficient to motivate governmental regulation. The final database
contained complete data for 236 zones. Although all data are
reported in Figures 3 and 4, the statistics reported in the text were
based on 209 inhabited zones for which per capita Gross Domestic
Product data exist; that excluded uninhabited and isolated atolls to
prevent biases due to the fact that we could not get data for all such
areas (i.e., United Kingdom and France, see above).
The Survey
For each of the attributes analyzed (i.e., scientific robustness,
policymaking transparency, enforcement capability, fishing effort
control, subsidies, and access to foreign fishing), we created a set of
questions whose answers could be ranked on a scale from worst- to
best-case scenarios. The resulting survey included 23 multiple
choice questions and was posted on the Internet (http://as01.ucis.
dal.ca/ramweb/surveys/fishery_assessment/) in five different
languages (i.e., English, Spanish, French, Portuguese, and
German). We searched for contacts (email addresses and phone
numbers) of fishery experts for all coastal territories in the world.
Our sources of information were reports on scientific and
administrative meetings relevant to fisheries, Web pages of
nongovernmental organizations, Web pages of fishery manage-
ment organizations in each territory, and proceedings of
international conferences on fisheries. The final directory included
contact information for 13,892 people. We sent personalized
emails using recommendations of email marketing companies to
prevent filtering of emails by local servers and promote
participation. The survey started in April 2007 and was completed
in April 2008. For zones where we did not receive an email
response, we carried out phone interviews with local experts, and
both email and phone queries were done until at least one full set
of responses was available for each zone. We received 1,188
positive responses including at least one from each country with
ocean access. Multiple responses for the same zone were averaged.
Justification of the Approach and Assessment of
Responders’ Reliability and Validity
Expert opinion surveys have been very popular in social,
medical, political, and economic sciences [40], and some examples
exist in fisheries studies (e.g., [41]). In fisheries research, expert
opinions have been categorized as a ‘‘highly reliable’’ method
given that overall, it works as a form of ‘‘peer review approach’’
and, for some crucial issues, is the only knowledge available (see
[42]). The approach is also cost-efficient and relatively fast. The
collection of empirical data for an analysis of this scale could prove
ineffective because country-scale data are patchy, in most cases
inaccessible through traditional searching engines, and because old
data may not describe current conditions. For these reasons, we
chose the survey of local experts to acquire data.
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The quality of expert opinion surveys relies on the consistency
of responders and their understanding of the issues. These
problems are defined as reliability and validity [40], which in
statistical terms are analogous to precision and accuracy. The
former basically considers the extent to which responders agree in
their responses and the latter the extent to which the responses
approach the truth. Evaluation of data reliability and validity also
allows assessment of the extent of expert biases, which may arise
for different reasons (e.g., cultural differences, patriotism, oppo-
sition to governmental institutions, etc.). Our assessment of
reliability and validity was as follows:
Reliability. To test the extent of consistency among
responders, we used data from EEZs for which duplicated
responses were received. We performed individual Pearson
correlations between each responder and the group of
responders (recommended by Fleiss [40]). We also tested the
significance of the levels of agreement by comparing the actual
levels of agreement among responders with the levels of agreement
expected when choices were made randomly (see Figure 1).
Analyzing 259 independent responses for 17 EEZs, we found a
high level of agreement among responders, with over 72% of the
cases showing Pearson correlation coefficients greater than 0.8
(Figure 1A). This was due to the fact that in 67% of the cases, the
responders chose exactly the same score for any given question,
and in 27%, the nearest choice (Figure 1B). Only in 5% of the
cases did the responders differ by more than one choice, and in
0.4%, they chose opposite scores (Figure 1B). The levels of
agreement and disagreement were significantly higher and lower,
respectively, than those expected by chance (Figure 1B). These
high levels of agreement are very likely due to the fact that
questions were general and the possible responses relatively broad.
Under these conditions, responses by different responders are most
likely to converge on similar or closely related scores.
Validity. The survey allowed questions to be left unanswered
so that responders could answer only the questions they knew
about. Most commonly, responders voluntarily, and at times upon
our request, gave contact information for other people better
placed to provide missing answers. To address the issue of validity,
our survey included a question on the extent to which countries
are rebuilding depleted fish stocks, an issue explicitly covered by
The United Nations Code of Conduct (Article 7, clause 7.6.10),
and evaluated in a survey carried out by Pitcher et al. [15]. The
scores from the two different sources (i.e., expert-based and
empirically based) for the countries in common were rescaled from
0 to 1 for comparison, and similarities evaluated using a Pearson
correlation. This analysis was based on 28 countries for which
empirical data were available and reliable to assign an empirical
score. The results of this analysis indicated a strong correlation
between expert opinion and empirical data (r=0.74, p,0.000006,
Figure 1C), although expert opinion tended to overestimate the
extent to which countries are rebuilding their depleted fisheries
(Figure 1C). Thus, the overall statistics provided here should likely
be considered a conservative (more optimistic) view of the actual
situation.
Quantification of Fisheries Sustainability
The metric we used to quantify fisheries sustainability has been
recently published in two independent publications [30,31], but
not applied to the landings of any country. Here, we provide a
brief description of its rationale and calculation, but extended
details are provided by Libralato et al. [31] and Coll et al. [30].
Fisheries catches represent a net export of mass and energy that
can no longer be used within an ecosystem; failure of the
ecosystem to compensate for that energy loss implies overexploi-
tation. This notion of overexploitation will require establishing a
contrast between the loss of energy in the ecosystem due to a
particular catch, the energy at the base of the food web in the area
where the catch was taken, and reference points indicating
whether the ratio between the energy that is taken (by fishing) and
produced (through primary production) is sustainable or not. This
concept has been recently incorporated into a metric that aims to
quantify the probability that an ecosystem is being sustainably
fished (Psust: after [31]). The metric first calculates the amount of
Primary Productivity Required (PPR after [43]) to sustain a catch
as PPR~
Xs
s~1
Wi
9
TETLi{1
 
, where s is the total number of
caught species, Wi is catch weight of each species i, TE is transfer
efficiency specific for the ecosystem, and TLi is the trophic level of
species i. The metric assumes a conservative 9:1 ratio for the
conversion of total weight to carbon [43]. The loss of energy in the
ecosystem (i.e., Lindex, after [31]) is calculated by comparing PPR
to the primary production at the base of the food web (PP) as
LIndex~
PPRTETlc{1
PPlnTE
, where TLc is the mean trophic level of the
catch as calculated from the TL and weight of each species in the
catch. PP is parameterized from chlorophyll pigment concentra-
tions and photosynthetically active radiation [30]. The probability
that such energy loss is sustainable (i.e., Psust) is calculated by
comparing Lindex to reference Lindexes in which overfishing or
sustainability have previously been identified. Reference Lindexes
were quantified for different regions worldwide using a set of well-
documented mass balance models representative of exploited
ecosystems and constructed with independent information for
each ecosystem [31]. Each of these models is classified as
overfished if it meets one or more of the following criteria: (1)
biomass of any species falls below minimum biologically
acceptable limit, (2) diversity decreases, (3) year-to-year variation
in populations or catches increases, (4) resilience to perturbations
decreases, (5) economic and social benefits decrease, and (5)
nontargeted species get impaired (see [30,31] and references
therein for justification of these criterion). Models were defined as
sustainable when the impacts of exploitation did not result in any
of the above symptoms. The frequency of sustainable or overfished
Lindexes allowed us to calculate the probability of sustainability
(Psust) for any particular Lindex value as Psust Lindexð Þ~
N LindexessustainablewLindexð Þ
N LindexessustainablewLindexð ÞzN LindexesoverexfishedvLindex
  , where N is the
number of models in which Lindexes lead to sustainable or
overfishing conditions. Probabilities of fisheries sustainability were
calculated for each EEZ in the world using catch data as from the
Sea Around Us fisheries database, which contains harmonized
data from a variety of sources including the Food and Agriculture
Organization (i.e., statistics on fisheries catches from 1950 to 2004;
[44]). That database adjusted landings data to account for the
fishing of long-distance fishing fleets (i.e., landings that are
reported by one country, but fished in a different one). Landings
data were also adjusted to include discards [45] and a global
estimate of illegal, unreported, or unregulated catches [46,47].
Linkage between Management Effectiveness and
Fisheries Sustainability
Data on fisheries sustainability was quantified for the year 2004
and linked to the effectiveness of fisheries management using a
classification/regression tree. A classification tree tests for
significant differences in fisheries sustainability among the quarters
of each attribute (note that the first and fourth quarters are the
extremes of a scale from worst- to best-case scenarios for each
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attribute; see Figure 2). The attribute that maximizes differences
among quarters (i.e., smallest p-value) is placed at the root of the
tree and the EEZs in each of those quarters separated in different
branches. Subsequently, the EEZs in each branch are tested for
significant differences among quarters of the remaining attributes.
The attribute that maximizes differences among quarters is placed
at the base of the branch and the EEZs in each of those quarters
separated in upper branches. The process is repeated until no
differences are found within each branch in any remaining
attribute. This analysis included all attributes considered in this
study: scientific robustness, policymaking transparency, imple-
mentation capability, fishing capacity, subsidies, access to foreign
fishing, and country wealth (i.e., 2007 per capita Gross Domestic
Product larger or smaller than US$10,000, respectively). Given the
inflation of Type I errors due to multiple comparisons, significance
was set at p,0.01.
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